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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of diversification on banks market value. Many studies have been conducted on 
the effect of diversification on firm value. From a theoretical view point, it is commonly accepted that if the costs of 
diversification exceed its benefits, the market will discount the share price of diversified firms. The paper 
hypothesized that diversification does not impact significantly on market value of banks in Nigeria. Adopting an Ex-
post facto research design and applying OLS, the regression results at 5% significant level of significance rejected 
the null hypothesis and thereby accepting the alternate. This suggests that corporate diversification impacts 
significantly on the market value of banks, implying that diversification in Nigerian banks impacts significantly on 
the market value of the diversified banks.      
Keywords: Diversification; market value; regression; banks. 
 
1. Introduction 
Many studies have been conducted on the effect of diversification on firm value.  Even theoretical arguments still 
suggest that diversification has both value-enhancing (benefits) and value reducing (costs) effects. From a theoretical 
view point, it is commonly accepted that if the costs of diversification exceed its benefits, the market will discount 
the share price of diversified firms (Boubaker, et. al., 2001). Empirically, however, results of prior researches are 
rather inconclusive. Indeed, several works suggested that diversified firms create value tanks to economies of scale, 
greater debt capacity, greater debt capacity due to risk reduction and a great number of profitable activities (Stein, 
1997). These diversified firms are said to be more profitable because of their ability to pool internally generated 
funds and allocate them properly; and such efficient allocation of resources and economies of scale are expected to 
have a positive impact on valuation (Stein, 1997; Teece 1990).  Based on a similar argument, Meyer, et. al., (1992) 
argued that a failing firm when standing alone cannot have a value less than zero but under the conglomerate 
structure the failing firm might have a negative value.  The profitable division(s) carrying the failing division(s) will 
ultimately reduce the value of the conglomerate. In contrast, other studies document value losses following corporate 
diversification; for instance, Berger and Ofek (1995) reported that the value loss is smaller when the segments of the 
diversified firms are in related industries. Recent studies focusing on the data of various developed countries 
generally reach similar results (Mansi and Rebb, 2002; Denis, et. al.2002, Barnes and Hardie – Brown, 2006). In 
emerging markets, Lins and Servaes (2002) also found that diversified firms trade at a discount of approximately 7% 
compared with single –segment firms and they are also less profitable than single-segment firms. 
The results of Chakrabarti, et. al., (2007) for East Asian firms are somewhat mitigated because diversification 
negatively impacts performance in more developed institutional environments while improving performance in the 
least developed environments. As far as the firm size is concerned, the majority of previous studies assess that the 
size of a firm has many effects on its performance, and indirectly on its growth opportunities and share prices. These 
benefits from diversification which increase the value of a diversified firm may arise from many sources such as: 
- From management economies of scale as proposed by Chandler (1977); 
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- More efficient resource allocation through internal capital markets by Stulz (1990) and Stein 
(1997);  
- Diversified firm’s ability to internalize market failures evidenced by Khanna and Palepu (2000); or  
- Higher productivity of diversified firms suggested by Schoar (2002). 
There are also many sources from which costs of diversification, which reduce the value of a diversified firm, may 
arise such as from: 
- Inefficient allocation of capital among divisions of a diversified firm (Lamont and Polk, 2001; 
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan, et. al., 2000); 
- Agency problems in a diversified firm can also generate costs of diversification. 
Given the above, this paper tends to explore the effect of corporate diversification on the market value of firms while 
concentrating on the banking industry. Based on this, some critical questions need to be asked and answered by this 
paper.  Such questions include: Has bank diversification affected the market value of Nigeria banks in any way? The 
objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of diversification on banks market value; and the paper 
hypothesizes Diversification does not impact significantly on market value of banks.  
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 highlights the review of related literature. 
Methodological issues are the concern of section 3. Section 4 is devoted to presentation of the data and results. We 
present conclusions in section 5.  
 
2. Review of Related Literature. 
Lang and Stulz (1994) shows Tobin’s q, a surrogate for a firm value, and firm diversification are negatively related 
through the 1980’s.  They also show that diversified firms have lower q’s than comparable portfolios of pure play 
firms; and firms that choose diversification are poor performers relative to firms that do not. Berger and Ofek (1995) 
also finds a value loss from diversification (about 15 percent loss) in 1980’s, while Servaes (1996) finds a 
diversification loss in the 1960’s, and a lesser extent in the 1970,s 
Using an econometric technique that remedies the measurement error problem in Tobin’s q, Whited (2001) finds no 
evidence of inefficient capital allocations in diversified firms and in value reductions by diversifications. Mansi and 
Rebb (2002) also find that diversification is insignificantly related to excess firm value. Thus, value discount by 
diversification in many studies may be artifacts of measurement errors in using Tobin’s q as a firm value proxy. In 
sum, results from previous studies on the diversification effect are neither consistent nor conclusive, which may be 
due to econometric problems (Li and Jin, 2006). In line with the above studies, Li and Jin, (2006) investigated the 
marginal effect of diversification on firm returns (in the chemical and oil industry) by resolving these econometric 
problems and controlling for influencing factors on returns other than diversification. Three-factor asset pricing 
models developed by Fama and French (1996) are used to avoid these econometric problems and control for other 
influencing factors on equity returns. Among independent variables in the model is market return (market effect), 
firm size (industry effect) and effect of endogenous variables (e.g. book value to market value) of a sample firm that 
lead the firm to decide to diversify or focus on stock returns. These regression models were estimated in chemical 
industry and oil industry, separately to control for the effect of industry specific characteristics on firm returns. The 
findings revealed that diversified firms have significantly higher returns than focused firms in both chemical and oil 
industries. It may be because the investor in the market view diversified firm riskier than focused firm and hence 
expect higher rate of return on invest in diversified firms than in the pure-play firms. As a result the value of a 
diversified firm is discounted upon acquisition of new division to preserve the higher rate of returns on investment in 
diversified firms. The results are robust across different diversification measures, methodologies and industries. 
Some researchers have argued that diversification increases the information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders (Harris, et. al., 1982). They contend that increased diversification makes it more difficult to get 
information about the firm. So, information asymmetry costs are higher in conglomerates than in more focused firms. 
Examination of the relationship between information asymmetry and market reaction to the announcement of 
seasoned equity offerings reveals that as the level of information asymmetry increases, the greater is the value loss to 
the firm (Dierkens, 1991). In a more recent work, Karim, et. al., (2000) documented that market reaction to seasoned 
equity offering is consistently negatively related to the level of information asymmetry. 
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Fee and Thomas (1999) studied the effect of corporate diversification on firm value based on asymmetric 
information.  In this study, Fee and Thomas (1999), investigated-comparing stock market based measures of 
asymmetric information for diversified firms with those they could reasonably expect to exhibit if they were split 
along industry lines into separately traded entities. Their findings revealed that approximately 74% of the diversified 
firms in their sample have less severe asymmetric information problems as conglomerates than they could expect to 
experience as separately traded pure-play firms.  They also found evidence that diversified firms with low levels of 
information asymmetric trade at significant diversification discounts. 
Amihud and Lev (1981) mentioned that managers prefer diversification in order to protect the value of their human 
capital.  In the context of both Jensen’s (1986) free “cash flow theory and ‘agency theory’, managers’ benefit from 
managing larger, diversified firms since such firms have relatively larger debt capacity. So, the management might 
tend to indulge them in value decreasing investment projects (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Agency problems resulting 
from sub-optimal behaviour of divisional managers (agents) for the firm as a whole may occur in a diversified firm 
due to opportunistic behaviour of divisional managers, informational asymmetries between central management and 
divisional managers, and the difficulty of designing optimal incentive compensation scheme to eliminate agency 
costs (Denis, et. al., 2002; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003). 
Anderson, et. al., (2000), equally made a study on corporate governance and firms diversification. They empirically 
investigated whether corporate governance structure is different between focused and diversified firms, and whether 
any differences in corporate governance are associated with the value loss from diversification. Their findings reveal 
that relative to focused firms, CEOS in diversified firms have lower stock ownership and lower pay-for-performance 
sensitivities.  Diversified companies, however, have more outside directors, no difference in independent block-
holdings, and sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance similar to that in single-segment firms.  Moreover, they 
found no compelling evidence that internal governance failures are associated with the decision to diversify, or that 
governance characteristics explain the value loss from diversification.  These their findings argue that the structure of 
corporate governance varies systematically with the degree of diversification and suggest that diversified firms use 
alternative governance mechanisms as substitute for low pay-for-performance sensitivities and CEO ownership.  
They concluded that agency costs do not provide a complete explanation for the magnitude and persistence of the 
diversification discount. They therefore added to the existing literature on “diversification and firm performance by 
providing a comprehensive analysis of differences in the overall structure of corporate governance between 
diversified and focused firms, and addressing how these differences are related to firm performance since most prior 
studies have focused on a single governance characteristic. 
 
3. Methodological Framework. 
This paper employed the Ex-post facto research design. Onwumere (2009:113) opined that Ex-post facto research 
involves events that have already taken place (already exists) and as such no attempt was made to control or 
manipulate relevant independent and dependent variables. Also, an analytical research, all manners of tools 
(mathematical, econometric, statistical etc,) were employed in the appraisal of data with the aim of establishing 
relationships (Onwumere, 2009:42). The population of this study is presumed to cover the twenty five (25) banks 
which emerged (out of 89 banks) having met the minimum capitalization requirement, at the close of the first phase 
of the consolidation programme on 31
st
 December, 2005 but for the analysis, eighteen (18) banks selected through 
the Yaro Yamane (1964)  formula constitutes our sample. The study relied on historic accounting data generated from 
financial (annual) reports and accounts of sampled banks between the period 1998 and 2007 (a ten-year period).  
 
3.1 The Test Statistic 
To test the hypothesis which states that diversification does not impact significantly on market value of banks, two 
model equations were used.  The first model equation used is written below:  
Evit, = βo + β1 ODi,t + β2GDi,t + β3LogTA + β4LRi,t + β50Ei,t  + цi,t ……………………. …(1) 
Where: Evi,t = Excess value of banki at time t.. 
OD = Operational Diversification 
GD = Geographical Diversification  
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LogTA = Log of Total Assets 
LR = Liquidity Ratio 
OE = Operational Efficiency 
βo = Constant of regression 
β1 - β5 = Coefficients of the independent variables 
µ = The stochastic error term. 
The second model equation to test the above hypothesis is as written below: 
Ev = bo + b1 DD + b2 LogTA + b3 CEGI + b4 GD + b5 OIGI + ε ………………………….(2) 
Where Ev = Excess value 
DD = Diversification Dummy 
LogTA = Log of Total Assets 
CEGI = ratio of Capital expenditure to Gross – income. 
GD = Geographical Diversification 
OIGI = Ratio of operational income To Gross income  
bo = constant of regression 
b1 = b5 = coefficients of the independent variables  
ε  = the stochiastic error term 
The essence of using these two model equations, equation 1 and equation 2 in regressing for Excess value in this 
work is to check for the fitness of the modified form (equation 2) of Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lins and Servaes 
(2002).  The modification of the equation3.1 is purposely for it to suit this work which is focused on institutions 
offering financial services while the researches of the Berger and Ofek (1995), and Lins and Servaes (2002) were 
based on non- financial firms. 
 
3.1 The Test Variables 
Firm Valuation Measures: According to Wild et al (2004:603), the two widely cited valuation measures are the price-
to-book (PB) and price-to-earnings (PE) ratios and users often base investment decisions on the observed values of 
these ratios.  These PB and P/E ratios are as such called fundamental ratios.  For companies whose shares are not 
traded in active markets, the fundamental ratios serve as a means for estimating equity value.  The formulae for these 
ratios are: 
(i) Price-to-book (PB) Ratio = Market Value of equity ………………………  3. 
                            Book Value of equity 
(ii) Price-to-Earnings Ratio = Market Value of equity ……………………......  4. 
                 Net Income 
OR 
  P/E = Market Value Per Share ……………………………………. 5. 
        Earnings per share    
Other measures that past researchers had used in measuring value of firms are return on Total Assets, Percentage 
growth rate in Total Assets and Excess Value of the firm.  This percentage growth Rate in Total Assets can be 
expressed as: 
Percentage Growth Rate in Total Assets = Current Value of Assets minus Base Value of Assets x 100 … 6. 
                    Base Value of Assets  
All these value measurement instruments were used in this research in one way or the other.  In using the % growth 
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rate in total Assets for the ten-year-period of this study, 1998 was used as a base year whereas the picking of the 
current value of Total Assets started with 1999 year. 
For the Excess Value, it is expressed in this study as Market Value Per share minus Book Value Per share.  Whereas 
the Book Value Per Share is obtained from Net Profit Value After Tax divided by the number of Outstanding shares 
i.e 
 Book Value per share =  Net Value After Tax ……………………  7. 
        The Number of Outstanding shares 
Liquidity Ratio: This is defined as the ratio of Total specified liquid assets to Total Current liabilities of each bank 
which must be held by the bank.  It can be calculated thus: 
Liquidity Ratio = Total Specified Liquid Assets …………………………………….. 8. 
                  Total current liabilities 
Firm size: Although there exist two measures of firm size – namely Total Assets and Turnover (Pandey, 2004:85, 
Barclay and Smith 1996:16), this research adopts Total Assets for firm size.  
Thus firm size = Average level of log of Total Assets (log TA)……….……………..  9.  
Because firm (bank) size and excess value may be correlated (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988) we include firm 
(bank) size, which we measure by total assets as a control variable in all our models. 
Operational efficiency:  According to Wild et al (2004) and Pandey (2004), a good measure of operational efficiency 
is the ratio of expenditure (operating expenses) to income. 
OE = Operational Expenses ………………………………………………………….. 10. 
  Income  
In this paper just as in Lin and Serveas (20002), the operational efficiency has been proxied by capital expenditure to 
Gross income  
That is, OE =  Capital expenditure …………………………………………………. … 11. 
               Gross income  
Ownership: Two main sets of ownership characteristics are adopted in the general regression models: Firstly, in 
terms of Operational diversification (OD) or diversification dummy (DD) whereby an indicator variable is set equal 
to one if the bank has subsidiaries/Affiliates; and/or conducts GROUP ANNUAL reports and accounts but equal to 
zero if the bank has no subsidiaries/Affiliates and thus has only the ‘BANK’ annual reports and accounts.  Secondly, 
in terms of Geographical diversification (GD) an indicator variable is set equal to one if the bank has dominant 
foreign interest (51% and above) but equal to zero for banks with dominant local interests. 
    
4. Findings 
Test for Hypothesis. 
H0 Diversification does not impact significantly on market value of banks. 
HA Diversification impacts significantly on market value of banks. 
This hypothesis was tested using two model equations: 
(a) The first model equation used is as follows: 
Evit = β0 + β1 ODi,t + β2 GDi, t + β3 logTai,t + β4 LRi,t + β5 0Ei,t + µI,t ……………………. (1) 
Excess value is the dependent variable. Evi,t = Excess value of bank i at time t and the other variables are as defined 
above. 
The regression results in table 1 shows that the regression is significant at 5 percent level of significance. Thus, the 
null hypothesis is rejected thereby accepting. As per the influence of the variables, the coefficient of the geographical 
diversification remains significantly positive meaning a positive relationship between internationalization and bank 
value whereas operational diversification was significantly negative. The result for operational efficiency under 
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Panel Model was positive but non-significant. This is equally an indication that not all the banks included in the 
study sample had the same level of efficiency, and hence value. Some might actually be inefficient. For both models, 
also, loan-to-deposit ratio proves to have positive but non-significant relationship with bank performance. The non-
significance nature of the coefficient of loan-to-deposit ratio is understandable especially considering the high 
volume of non-performing credits carried by the banks during the periods covered in this study. In terms of the R
2
 
value, the results show that about 10.8 to 11.5 percent of the changes in the performance of a bank can be explained 
by changes in the levels of operating efficiency, geographical and operational diversifications, and loan-to-deposit 
ratio. The results are not also by chance considering the probability of F-value at just 0.00 percent. 
The second model equation is the modified form of multiple linear regression equation used by Berger and Ofek 
(1995) Lins and Servaes (2002) which is shown below and as defined in section three: 
Ev = bo + bi DD +b2 logTA +b3 CEGI + b4 GD + b5 OIGI + e ………………..(2) 
The individual parameters of the regression model are tested through t-test for parameters.  
For the analysis Excess Value is defined thus:  
 
 
Where the imputed market value is obtained as the median actual market value of stand-alone banks times the actual 
market value of diversified banks. No restriction is given to excess values; all the excess values that were obtained 
were used in the analysis. The regression results are described thus. 
The ANOVA in table 3 tests the acceptability of the model from a statistical perspective. The Regression row 
displays information about the variation accounted for by the model. The Residual row displays information about 
the variation that is not accounted for by the model. The regression and residual sums of squares are not equal, which 
indicates that about 90% of the variation in excess value is explained by the model. The significant value of the F 
statistic is less than 0.05 and to be more precise is 0.00: which means that the variation explained by the model is not 
due to chance. While the ANOVA table is a useful test of the model's ability to explain any variation in the dependent 
variable, it does not directly address the strength of that relationship. 
The model summary table (table 4) reports the strength of the relationship between the model and the dependent 
variable. R, the multiple correlation coefficients is the linear correlation between the observed and model-predicted 
values of the dependent variable = .936. This indicates a strong relationship. R Square, the coefficient of 
determination, is the squared value of the multiple correlation coefficients = .88. It shows that about 88% of the 
variation in excess value is explained by the model. Equally, the work relied on the adjusted coefficient of the 
multiple determinants because of the number (five) of explanatory variables used in the study. This is to harmonize 
the numerator with the denominator in the coefficient formula.  Accordingly from Table 4, adjusted coefficient = 
87.3%  and indicates that 87.3% of changes in the dependent variable (Excess Value) are explained by change in the 
five explanatory variables in the model.  This is a high value and can be relied upon as a proper fit for the model. 
Although the model fit looks positive in table 5, the coefficients shows that (CEGI) ratio of Capital expenditure to 
Gross – income in the model is not significant and does not impact on the dependent variable (Excess Value). All 
other predictor variables have significant coefficients as follows: at .000 for total assets and the ratio of capital 
expenditure to gross expenditure each; .004 and 001 for Geographical Diversification and Ratio of operational 
income To Gross income respectively. These indicates that the explanatory variables contributed to the model and 
impacts on the value of banks.  
With reference to the analytical results obtained in the two regression results above, the hypothesis that 
diversification does not impact significantly on market value of banks is rejected, thereby accepting the alternate. 
This then implies that diversification impacts significantly on market value of banks. 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this research is to investigate the impact of diversification on banks market values and was 
achieved. Here the regression results is significant at 5 percent level of significance, thus the null hypothesis is 
rejected and thereby accepting the alternate. This means that diversification in Nigerian Deposit Money Banks 
impacts significantly on the market value of such banks. The benefits from diversification which increases the value 
log
actual market value
Excess value
imputed market value
 
=  
   
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of a diversified firm may arise from many sources such as: from management economies of scale as proposed by 
Chandler (1977); more efficient resource allocation through internal capital markets as opined by (Stulz, 1990, and 
Stein, 1997); diversified firm’s ability to internalize market failures (Khanna and Palepu, 2000); or higher 
productivity of diversified firms as suggested by (Schoar, 2002). 
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Table 1: Estimated coefficients for both Pooled and Panel Regression Models – with Excess Value as the 
Endogenous Factor 
 Pooled  Panel  
Variables Co efficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Operating efficiency 0.254* 3.01 0.822* 2.18 
Geographical Diversification 0.010 0.14 0.882* 2.71 
Operational Diversification -0.119* -2.65* -0.632* -3.66 
Liquidity ratio 0.999* 241.75* 0.020 1.04 
Constant -0.177* -3.51 7.222* 37.81 
R
2
 Within  - - 0.123 
 Between - - 0.255 - 
 Overall 0.998 - 0.115 - 
F-test 14,662.79 - 22.79 - - 
Prob>F 0.000 - 0.000 - 
No of observation 149 - 179 - 
* Regression is significant at 5 percent level of significance. 
Source: Authors SPSS computation. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
Excess Value .9273070 1.36482769 150 
DD .72 .451 150 
LogTA 7.0643558 1.17679398 150 
CE_GI .3382433 .21769220 150 
GD .07 .250 150 
OI_GI .7163866 .13675944 150 
Source: Authors SPSS result. 
Table 3: The ANOVA 
ANOVAb
243.355 5 48.671 204.956 .000a
34.196 144 .237
277.550 149
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), OI_GI, GD, CE_GI, DD, LogTAa. 
Dependent Variable: ExcessValueb. 
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Table 4: Model Summary. 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin 
Watson 
1 .936(a) .877 .873 .48730956 1.812 
a  Predictors: (Constant), OI_GI, GD, CE_GI, DD, LogTA 
Source: Authors’ SPSS regression result. 
Table 5: Coefficients. 
Coefficientsa
6.885 .383 17.991 .000
.418 .094 .138 4.465 .000
-.990 .037 -.854 -26.971 .000
.108 .187 .017 .576 .565
-.488 .165 -.090 -2.962 .004
1.020 .301 .102 3.389 .001
(Constant)
DD
LogTA
CE_GI
GD
OI_GI
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: ExcessValuea. 
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